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mention violations of the NPT or to explain why nations would have joined Nato
had there been no inequitable Soviet threat.
Even those who share the author’s beliefs
in a smaller American defense structure
or minimal deterrence would be confused by many of his supporting reasons.
At one point, Steinbruner castigates the
former colonial powers for not intervening quickly enough in the civil wars of
their violence-prone former colonies.
How would they do so without possessing superior military force? Steinbruner
describes the internal conflict that
plagues much of the world, including terrorism, as a “contagion”—as if it were a
theoretical illness that had nothing to do
with actions of actual people. As in the
logic (some might say illogic) of the prisoners’ dilemma and tit-for-tat games
once used to describe the theory of nuclear deterrence, neither the magnanimity nor the fears of the human spirit play
a role in this book’s equation.
Despite the publisher’s reputation and
the implied support of influential
(mostly retired) authorities, serious students of globalization or defense policy
should avoid this book. It is not merely a
weak argument; these are not principles
of global security for the real world.
SAM TANGREDI

Captain, U.S. Navy
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Williams, Cindy, ed. Holding the Line: U.S. Defense
Alternatives for the 21st Century. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001. 289pp. $21.95

This is the rare book that actually lives up
to its blurbs. It should be required reading for U.S. defense planners, especially
Bush administration officials for whom
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increasing defense spending rather than
“holding the line” is an article of faith.
They would profit greatly from the volume’s analysis of where not to look for
the savings that might pay for the administration’s promised transformation of
the military. Hint: cutting infrastructure
will not pay for military transformation.
Cindy Williams, a senior research fellow
in the Strategic Studies Program at MIT
and a former assistant director for national security at the Congressional Budget Office, has assembled an impressive
group of contributors. In a focused, well
integrated volume, they take on a range
of pressing defense issues that converge
on a central, critical question: how can
the U.S. military be reshaped—transformed—while holding the line on defense spending? Holding the line means
maintaining defense spending at about
$300 billion (in fiscal year 2000 budgetauthority dollars) for ten years. That
amount, it is argued, is sufficient for
transformation if it is spent effectively
and efficiently—which requires merely
discarding outmoded strategy and force
structure.
In her introductory chapter, Williams
lays the foundation for what follows with
an instructive discussion of the post–Cold
War drawdown, the pressures generating
rising defense costs, the reasons we
should not succumb to those pressures,
and the need to reconcile strategy and
practice and to recalibrate the twomajor-theater-wars yardstick that was
used to size U.S. conventional forces after
the Gulf War. An effective force-protection
device, the two-major-theater-wars standard is both the source of rising defense
costs and an obstacle to a fiscally responsible transformation of the U.S. military.
Williams is especially struck by the fact
that each service’s share of defense
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spending has been held essentially constant since the end of the Cold War.
Strategy and force structure alternatives
advanced by three of the contributors
propose to take care of that problem.
Lawrence Korb develops Williams’s account of contemporary defense planning
with a critical appraisal of the Pentagon’s
three post–Cold War reassessments—the
first Bush administration’s 1990 “Base
Force,” which introduced the two-majorregional-wars construct; the Clinton administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review;
and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which also embraced the two-war
view. Korb also delightfully exposes the
misleading assumptions that inform the
conventional wisdom about the inadequacy of current levels of defense
spending.
The search for ways to utilize Department of Defense monies more effectively
and efficiently begins with nonsolutions.
Williams convincingly argues that infrastructure reform—eliminating functions,
consolidating and collocating activities,
privatization, and outsourcing—“will not
be the miracle cure for the Pentagon’s
budget woes.” Gordon Adams finds that
for strategic, political, technological, and
economic reasons, contemporary burden
sharing by America’s European allies can
yield no more of a budgetary payoff than
it did during the Cold War. Further cuts
in nuclear forces will not result in significant savings either, according to David
Mosher, who expects, not unreasonably,
that “missile defenses will be the most
likely cause of budget growth.”
The resources required for transformation can only be extracted from the conventional force structure. It is the Army,
Air Force, or Navy (and Marines)—take
your pick—that will bear the brunt of restructuring. Owen Cote advances the
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alternative likely to be most popular
among readers of this journal—a navalcentric strategy and force structure that
features a significantly more innovative
Navy. Under this alternative, a somewhat
smaller Air Force and a more significantly reduced but more mobile Army
would be the bill payers. James Quinlivan
proposes what he considers a balanced
future force structure centered on a reorganized, modernized Army. The Navy
would lose two carrier battle groups under this alternative; the Marine Corps
and the Air Force would be smaller as
well. To support what he labels a “flexible
power projection strategy,” Karl Mueller
would shift resources from the Army and
Navy to a modernized, more capable Air
Force. The Army would give up 30 percent of its active combat forces and
two-thirds of its National Guard units,
while the Navy would have to make do
with nine rather than twelve aircraft
carriers.
Cote, Quinlivan, and Mueller each identify the strategic assumptions upon
which their respective force structures
are built. Their assumptions about the
future security environment differ significantly. Unfortunately, we do not know
what that security environment will actually look like. Defense planners, by nature cautious and conservative in the face
of uncertainty, will want to hedge against
each set of problems the authors identify;
one way of doing this is to acquire the
full range of capabilities they describe. In
the end, while we know we should look
to the conventional force structure to resolve the resource dilemma, the dilemma
remains unresolved. What we still need is
a reliable means of choosing among the
assumptions—no small intellectual challenge. A larger dose of grand strategy
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than provided in Williams’s introductory
chapter is required for that undertaking.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Brasher, Bart. Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987–2015. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
257pp. $67

Bart Brasher begins his retrospective discussion of Implosion with a simple synopsis in chapter 1, “The Last 1,000 Days
of the Cold War.” Mentioned in this
chapter is a discussion of the period of
the Reagan administration when Defense
personnel numbers and budget authority
reached their peaks. He includes interesting USA Today statistics about defense
spending in the United States and in the
USSR, as well as a breakdown of how
many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines were serving. He also discusses
how each service recruits, tests, and promotes its enlisted and officer personnel.
Brasher then proceeds to the topic of the
security environment (primarily by describing where U.S. military forces are
deployed and in what numbers), the demise of the Soviet Union, and various
operations that the U.S. military was involved in through the end of the 1980s.
He closes this chapter with a discussion
of the base realignment process, military
readiness at the end of the Cold War, and
the size of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, reserve components, and
nuclear forces.
The book’s style is readable, and Brasher
takes time to explain acronyms, even to
describe how civilian control of the military is organized. His explanations about
the military and government processes
are clear even for the uninitiated.
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However, it is clear well before the end of
the first chapter that the author’s approach consists primarily of stringing together information gleaned from various
sources; the first thirty-four-page chapter
contains 151 endnotes. Also, the book is
replete with numbers and statistics; the
average paragraph contains at least two
or three. For example, the following is
the concluding paragraph of the discussion of Operation JUST CAUSE: “Casualty
figures for the invasion included 24
Americans dead, including two who were
killed accidentally by their own forces.
The number of U.S. wounded was 324,
while the PDF suffered 314 killed, 124
wounded, and 5,313 captured. Serious
estimates of Panamanian noncombatants
killed ran from 100 to 202. Within a few
years, Panama was a democracy and
Noriega was in a stateside prison, convicted of the narcotics charges brought
against him.”
The next several chapters fall into a pattern. For each year from 1990 through
1994, Brasher uses statistical tidbits to
discuss human resources, the security environment, the “Base Force” (and other
alternate force structures), military readiness, and downsizing. Each chapter sets
forth the “security environment,” a chronological account of defense and military
issues, primarily illuminated by forcedeployment statistics. Subchapters cover
in a clear and concise fashion such subjects
as contingency operations, the BottomUp Review, the base closure process,
modernization, and “topsizing.” Chapter
7 covers the downsizing of the military
from 1995 and 1996, and chapter 8 covers the “Quadrennial Defense Review and
the Out-Years, 1997 to 2015.” Brasher’s
conclusions, which occupy two pages, include: “Although many equate the initiation of personnel and force structure
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